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Recent research has produced models that improve our ability to identify, describe and 
explain a diversity of knowledge-flow patterns that manifest themselves in various 
enterprises, which improves our efficacy in designing organizations and processes. But 
enterprises do not all operate in the same environmental context and current theory is 
relatively silent on contextual implications of knowledge flow. The research described in 
this technical report builds upon current theory to explicitly address the contextual 
implications of knowledge flow in terms of organization and process design. Using a 
recently developed, multidimensional model to characterize and delineate a variety of 
enterprise knowledge flows, we integrate key aspects of Coordination Theory and extend 
this model to address context. The use, utility and implications of this extended model are 
described through application to an extreme case in which knowledge flows are 
embedded within a hazardous, time-critical context with mortal consequences: a military 
“friendly fire” incident in Northern Iraq. The extreme nature of this application case 
provides revelatory insight into the contextual importance of knowledge-flow dynamics, 
and by using such an extreme case for application, we enhance the generalizability of our 
model to less extreme environments that are more commonly associated with non-
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Imagine that you are a knowledge worker, reporting as usual to your customary 
workplace, interacting in standard fashion with your regular group of coworkers, 
interfacing with the familiar set of tools and technologies associated with your 
workplace, and performing work tasks as part of your ordinary professional routine. 
Now imagine that, in the middle of this work environment and routine, as you are 
working and conversing with coworkers, you hear a noise, and suddenly, without 
warning, the whole work area explodes, and you and your coworkers are killed instantly. 
Does this sound far-fetched and unlikely in the context of your work environment? 
Welcome to the context of joint military operations. 
 
Many scholars (e.g., Drucker 1995) assert that knowledge represents one of the very 
few sustainable sources of comparative advantage, and the practice of knowledge 
management (KM) takes the power of knowledge to the group, organization and even 
enterprise level (Davenport and Prusak 1998). Within the rubric of KM, current survey 
work identifies knowledge flow as a key area in need of additional research, indicating 
that there are "large gaps in the body of knowledge in this area" (Alavi and Leidner 2001, 
p. 126). If we accept that knowledge is even an entity that can flow (Brown and Duguid 
1998), then understanding how to manage and enhance such flow is central to attaining 
and sustaining competitive advantage. 
 
To facilitate such understanding, recent research on the phenomenology of knowledge 
flow (Nissen 2002) has produced models that improve the ability to identify, describe and 
explain a diversity of knowledge-flow patterns that manifest themselves in various 
enterprises—in the private and public sectors alike (e.g., businesses, corporations, 
governmental agencies, military units)—and this improves our efficacy in designing 
organizations and processes. But enterprises do not all operate in the same environment, 
and effective organization and process design must explicitly take into account the 
context of knowledge flows (Nissen et al. 2000). Unfortunately, current theory is 
relatively silent on contextual implications of knowledge flow. 
 
The research described in this technical report builds upon current theory to explicitly 
address the contextual implications of knowledge flow in terms of organization and 
process design. Using a recently developed, multidimensional model to characterize and 
delineate a variety of enterprise knowledge flows, we integrate key aspects of 
Coordination Theory and extend this model to address context. The use, utility and 
implications of this extended model are described through application to an extreme case 
in which knowledge flows are embedded within a hazardous, time-critical context with 
mortal consequences: a military “friendly fire” incident in Northern Iraq. The extreme 
nature of this application case provides revelatory insight (Yin 1994) into the contextual 
importance of knowledge-flow dynamics, and by using such an extreme case for 
application, we enhance the generalizability of our model to less extreme environments 
that are more commonly associated with non-military enterprises (e.g., corporations, 
governmental agencies). 
 1
 DYNAMIC KNOWLEDGE-FLOW MODEL 
In this section, research is summarized to conceptualize a four-dimensional model of 
knowledge-flow dynamics. First there is a summary of the integration and extension of 
two well-known models from the literature. This model is then employed to characterize 
and delineate knowledge flows associated with a software project for illustration. In this 




Drawing from Nissen (2002), the two models from the literature are called the Spiral 
Model and the Life Cycle Model. They are both well known and widely cited, so their 
principal elements are only briefly summarized here. The Spiral Model is described by 
Nonaka (1994), and it employs two dimensions to characterize knowledge as it flows 
through the enterprise: epistemological and ontological. As delineated in Figure 1, 
Nonaka uses interaction between these dimensions as the principal means for describing 
knowledge flow, which is characterized by a "spiral" dynamic through four enterprise 












Figure 1. Spiral Model (Adapted from Nonaka 1994) 
 
Briefly, socialization denotes members of a team sharing experiences and perspectives, 
much as one anticipates through communities of practice. Externalization denotes the use 
of metaphors through dialog that leads to articulation of tacit knowledge and its 
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 subsequent formalization to make it concrete and explicit. Combination denotes 
coordination between different groups in the organization—along with documentation of 
existing knowledge—to combine new, intra-team concepts with other, explicit 
knowledge in the organization. Internalization denotes diverse members in the 
organization applying the combined knowledge from above—often through trial and 
error—and in turn translating such knowledge into tacit form at the organization level. 
 
The Life Cycle Model represents an amalgamation of several knowledge-flow 
conceptualizations described in the literature (e.g., Despres and Chauvel 1999, Gartner 
Group 1999, Davenport and Prusak 1998, Nissen 1999) that employ the concept life 
cycle. The life cycle concept is the subject of textbook discussion in terms of IS design 
(e.g., Fertuk 1992), and it has been used to describe the sequence of activities associated 
with business process re-engineering (Guha et al. 1994, Kettinger et al. 1995). In the 
present context, the Life Cycle Model includes six discrete phases of knowledge as it 
flows through the enterprise: 1) creation, 2) organization, 3) formalization, 4) 
dissemination, 5) application, and 6) evolution (Nissen et al. 2000). Note that in the 
organization design literature each phase is a separate task to be performed.  The word 
“phase” connotes a sense of the overall process.   
 
Briefly, the creation phase begins the life cycle, as new knowledge is generated within 
an enterprise. The second phase pertains to the organization, mapping or bundling of 
knowledge. Phase three addresses mechanisms for making knowledge formal or explicit, 
and the fourth phase concerns the ability to share or distribute knowledge in the 
enterprise. Knowledge application for problem solving or decision making in the 
organization constitutes Phase  five, and a sixth phase is included to cover knowledge 
refinement and evolution, which reflects organizational learning through time. 
 
Clearly, these two models share a number of common ideas. For instance, both the 
Spiral Model and Life Cycle Model conceptualize knowledge passing through various 
stages as it flows through the enterprise (e.g., socialization, externalization), and both 
models imply directionality (e.g., socialization precedes externalization, creation 
precedes organization). Also, both models describe mechanisms for iteration (e.g., 
knowledge-flow processes and phases can be repeated in cycles), and both models focus 
on characterizing the dynamics of knowledge flow.  
 
The first step of integrating these models is to augment the two variables of the Spiral 
Model (i.e., epistemological, ontological) through incorporation of the Life Cycle 
variable. This incorporation increases the number of model variables to three.  It can be 
represented in a vector space.  The incorporation of the Life Cycle variable permits the 
tracing of the spiral flow of knowledge across various life cycle phases. The second step 
is to extend this integrated model by incorporating the dimension time. This extension 
increases the model’s variables to four, and permits the description of the dynamics, the 
time path, and knowledge flow.  For instance, it is possible to trace the flow time of 
knowledge as it spirals along the life cycle.  The third step is to clarify the language used. 
Because Nonaka’s terminology for the variables (reflected in Figure 1) can lead to 
confusion (e.g., with respect to use of the terms epistemological and ontological), the 
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 term explicitness is substituted for epistemological and the term reach is substituted for 
ontological in the integrated model.  With these three steps, the resulting four-variable 
model preserves—and indeed subsumes—both the Spiral Model and Life Cycle Model, 
and it provides the basis for a richer understanding. The integrated model is used to guide 
an understanding to the friendly fire incident.  
Model Illustration 
 
The model has four variables.  To illustrate the model using three variable pictures, 
one of the variables must be held constant.  The first variable held constant is time.  Time 
is modeled as a sequence of discrete time periods.  In the first discussion, time is fixed at 
some time period and the other variables are discussed.  Then a multi-period model is 
considered. 
 
Again drawing heavily from Nissen (2002), a few, notional, knowledge-flow vectors 
are noted in Figure 2 for illustrating and classifying various dynamic patterns of 
knowledge as it flows through the enterprise. Consider, for instance, the simple, linear 
flow labeled “P&P”.  It depicts the manner in which most enterprises inform and train 
employees through the use of policies and procedures: explicit documents and guidelines 
that individuals in the organization are expected to memorize, refer to and observe. As 
another instance, the cyclical flow of knowledge described by the amalgamated KM life 
cycle model from above, depicted and labeled in the figure, reflects a more-complex 
dynamic than its “P&P” counterpart.  As depicted, this latter flow delineates a cycle of 




Figure 2. Extended Model with Knowledge Flows 
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 Further, Nonaka’s dynamic theory of knowledge flow can also be delineated in this 
space by the curvilinear vector sequence K-S-E-C-I, corresponding to the processes of 
knowledge creation, socialization, externalization, combination, and internalization, 
respectively. In Figure 2 notes that the K-S-E-C-I sequence involves all the phases of life 
cycle (note that it is a 3-D representation).  Thus the integrated model subsumes the one 
proposed by Nonaka, and it reveals a somewhat-complex dynamic as knowledge flows 
along the life cycle. Moreover, examination of this space suggests also including the 
refinement vector (i.e., V), which is not part of Nonaka’s theory but represents a key 
element of the empirically derived, Life Cycle Model (e.g., key to knowledge evolution). 
Refinement is the evolutionary detailing and adjustment of knowledge.  Clearly, a great 
many other flows and patterns can be depicted in this manner. Preliminary results from 
fieldwork (Nissen 2001 for research agenda) suggest that this three variable subset of the 
model (represented as a vector-space) is very useful in depicting and visualizing 
knowledge flows in an empirical investigation into the phenomenology of knowledge 
flow. 
 
The discussion now turns to illustrating time as a multi-period sequence.  In a multi-
period model, the variables as shown in Figure 2 are repeated for each period.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 2A.  Now, each phase of the life cycle can occur in different time 
periods, with some phase(s) extending over several time periods.  The same idea extends 
to the K-S-E-C-I-V sequence.  To ease the exposition in this technical report, time will 
be discussed and illustrated in a much simpler manner.  Consider the life cycle of a 
knowledge process.  On average a knowledge process has a mean time to complete one 
cycle.  The mean time of        complete one cycle is a surrogate used for illustrating a 
multi-period model.  Analysis of the mean time to complete one cycle for an 
organizational task (e.g. software development) is used to characterize the order-of-
magnitude differences of knowledge flow times associated with the knowledge needed to 
perform a particular organizational task. 
 
For instance, if we take some highly explicit knowledge—say a printed document 
describing how to install a major software application on one’s desktop personal 
computer—then this flow of knowledge can conceivably be completed in a matter of 
hours, as a literate person needs only to read the instructions before being able to 
effectively install the software. We plot this first instance of knowledge flow (i.e., “S/W 
installation”) in the figure, which delineates its three-dimensional classification as: 1) 
highly explicit knowledge, 2) involving only one person in terms of reach, 3) with flow 
time on the order of hours. 
 
Notice a distinction in this example between the flow of work (i.e., installing 
software) and the complementary flow of knowledge (i.e., understanding installation 
instructions) that enables such work to be effected. Thus, in diagrams such as Figure 3, 
we are explicitly delineating the knowledge-flow processes that drive knowledge 
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Figure 3. Knowledge Flows with Time Dimension 
 
 
As another instance, let’s take this same document and consider the flow associated 
with its creation. Presumably, the authors of a software-installation document would be 
knowledgeable about the corresponding software application, as well as how to write 
effective installation instructions. And depending on how extensive and complex such an 
application is, understanding its installation idiosyncrasies could take several months to 
effect, even though writing the instructions themselves could probably be accomplished 
in a matter of weeks. Here again, we differentiate between the flow of work (i.e., writing 
installation instructions; requiring weeks) and the corresponding flow of knowledge (i.e., 
understanding software-installation idiosyncrasies; requiring months) that enables such 
work to be performed effectively.  
 
Notice also, the mean time to complete a cycle, the flow time associated with 
knowledge required to develop the installation document (e.g., months) is one or more 
orders of magnitude longer than the complementary flow time associated with an 
individual understanding how to install the software (e.g., hours). This second knowledge 
flow (i.e., “Doc creation”) is plotted in the figure, as it represents moderately explicit 
knowledge (e.g., some tacit knowledge is required to understand the software), involving 
a group of people (e.g., 10) in terms of reach (e.g., assuming that people from several 
different organizations are required to develop the instructions), and requiring months for 
the knowledge to complete its flow. 
 
As a third instance, consider development of the software application itself. Again 
depending upon the extensiveness and complexity, a comparatively long period of time 
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 could be required for people to acquire the levels of software-engineering knowledge and 
experience necessary for its development. Consider that the software architects and 
engineers must complete several years of college and acquire numerous years of software 
experience before acquiring the knowledge and experience required to develop a major 
software product. In some cases, a decade or more may be necessary for the requisite 
knowledge to complete its flow and enable someone to develop the software application.  
 
This third instance (i.e., “S/W development”) is plotted in the figure showing the 
knowledge required to develop software is relatively tacit when compared to the 
knowledge from above, and this knowledge flow is shown at the individual level. But to 
develop a major software application such as discussed in this example, a large number 
of individual software architects and engineers must further learn to work effectively in 
groups and organizations. This team-building knowledge flow is depicted (i.e., “Team 
building”) in the figure, concerning relatively tacit knowledge, involving many people 
(e.g., 100) in a relatively large organization in terms of reach, and conceivably requiring 
years to complete its flow. Once again, the flow of work to develop a software 
application and the complementary flow of knowledge (e.g., software engineering, team-
building) that drives it is distinguished.   
 
Further, if we trace the flow of knowledge through the life cycle depicted in the figure, 
we develop a composite illustration of its dynamics. For instance, assume that the phases 
of the lifecycle are independent.  That is, the composite process does not have any 
feedback loops from a phase to a previous phase.  The composite knowledge flow begins 
with education and experience qualifying a person to develop software (i.e., “S/W 
development”), which is highly tacit and requires a decade or more to flow for a given 
individual. The next flow involves building an effective team to develop the software 
(i.e., “Team building”), which is delineated as tacit and involving many people over 
years. The knowledge required to write and test the installation instructions is more 
explicit, requiring fewer people and less time to acquire (i.e., “Doc creation”), and the 
flow of knowledge associated with reading the instruction and installing the software is 
labeled “S/W installation” (i.e., highly explicit, individual, hours). The broad arrows in 
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Figure 4. Composite Knowledge Flow 
MODEL EXTENSION 
The key to addressing context through our model is to examine the manner in which 
diverse knowledge-flow patterns intermediate the relationship between enterprise 
coordination and performance. Specifically drawing from the organizational design and 
coordination literatures, it is clear that not every coordination approach is appropriate for 
every pattern of knowledge flows that may become manifest in a particular enterprise and 
context. Rather, one can use the manifest knowledge-flow pattern to determine which 
coordination approach is likely to be most effective in a given context. This represents a 
substantial step forward in terms of practical application of emerging knowledge-flow 
theory, and it serves to integrate the literature of knowledge management with those of 
organizational design and coordination. This integration is an important theoretical 
evolution. 
 
This discussion begins by coarsely dividing a three-dimensional representation of 
knowledge-flow space into octants by making binary distinctions along each of the three 
axes. For instance, the explicitness axis into two parts: one, near the origin, 
characterizing flows involving tacit knowledge, the other associated with explicit flows. 
Likewise, the reach axis is divided into two parts: one, near the origin, pertaining to 
knowledge flows limited to individuals and groups, the other associated with 
organization-wide and inter-organizational flows. Similarly, the flow-time axis is divided 
into two parts: one, near the origin, demarcating relatively short-duration knowledge 
flows (e.g., hours, days, weeks), the other to depict longer duration flows (e.g., months, 






























Figure 5. Divided Knowledge-Flow Vector Space 
 
Within this space, several regions to various coordination approaches are mapped. 
Drawing from Thompson (1967), for instance, consider the three coordination 
approaches termed standardization, planning, and mutual adjustment, which correspond 
respectively to three different classes of task interdependence, namely, pooled, 
sequential, and reciprocal. These three classes of interdependence and their 
corresponding coordination approaches have been well studied and broadly discussed 
through the literature, and the relative advantages, disadvantages and appropriateness of 
each is well known. For instance, Grant (1996) draws from this rich literature to indicate 
that standardization represents the most economical approach to coordination, 
particularly for large enterprises, but this approach is ineffective beyond cases of pooled 
interdependence. And once such standards are established and the corresponding 
knowledge is internalized by an enterprise, processes relying upon this coordination 
mode become relatively inflexible and difficult to change in response to enterprise 
problems or environmental shifts. Conversely, mutual adjustment enables great process 
flexibility and rapid change by the enterprise, but this coordination mode requires 
extensive communication—along with a common base of knowledge and experience—
and is not nearly as economical as its standardization counterpart. Coordination by 
planning falls somewhere in between these two in terms of economy and flexibility. 
 
Considering the three- variable model of knowledge flows, the regions most suitable 
for coordination through these three approaches can be identified and plotted. Beginning 
with coordination by standardization, by definition, standards are explicit, and for them 
to be effective in coordinating enterprise activities, they must be applied organization-
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 wide. Thus, the region high on the explicitness axis and far to the right in terms of reach 
is so identified. And as noted above, it takes time for knowledge associated with 
standards to diffuse through the enterprise, and once diffused, standards are relatively 
inflexible in the short term. Hence the region associated with the standards approach to 
coordination is also quite far out with respect to the flow-time axis. Indeed, by examining 
the plot position of a standards-based approach to coordination in Figure 5 (i.e., listed as 
“Std”), one can see that the corresponding region of the space is extreme across all three 
dimensions (i.e., highly explicit, broad reach, long flow time). The suggestion from this 
model is that coordination by standardization is most appropriate for knowledge flows 
associated with this extreme region. The model would also suggest that coordination by 
standardization becomes less appropriate as knowledge flows diverge from this octant in 
the vector space. 
 
Next, coordination by mutual adjustment is addressed. As noted above, mutual 
adjustment is communications-intensive yet flexible, enabling rapid change but 
restricting its applicability in terms of reach. This coordination approach is also based 
more on tacit knowledge shared between enterprise participants than explicit documents 
(e.g., published standards, policies and procedures, military doctrine). Thus, coordination 
by mutual adjustment is plotted in the figure (i.e., “MA”) low on the explicitness axis 
(i.e., involving tacit knowledge), low on the reach axis (e.g., pertaining to individuals and 
groups), and low on the flow-time axis (i.e., associated with fast-flowing knowledge). 
Notice, plot positions for coordination by standardization and coordination by mutual 
adjustment occupy opposite corners of the three-dimensional space delineated in Figure 
5. As noted above, coordination by planning falls somewhere in between standardization 
and mutual adjustment, so it is plotted (i.e., “Plan”) at the center of the vector space 
depicted in the figure. 
 
Table 1. Knowledge Flows and Coordination Approaches 
Explicitness Reach Flow Time Coordination 
High High High Standardization 
Medium Medium Medium Planning 
Low Low Low Mutual Adjustment 
 
As the model is further developed, it is possible to identify a correspondence between 
various classes of knowledge flows and the most appropriate coordination approaches. 
This correspondence is summarized in Table 1 where only high, medium, and low levels 
are distinguished across each of the knowledge-flow model dimensions. The table also 
lists the most appropriate coordination approach corresponding to the knowledge flow 
characteristic.. Clearly, entries in the table correspond with plot positions of each 
coordination approach delineated in Figure 5  
 
This table can be used both prescriptively and diagnostically. For instance, in terms of 
prescription, if knowledge flows that are extreme across all three dimensions (i.e., high in 
explicitness, high in reach, high in flow time), then this model would point to 
coordination by standardization as most appropriate. In terms of diagnostics, if 
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 knowledge flows that are low across all three dimensions (i.e., low in explicitness, low in 
reach, low in flow time) are encountered, for instance, corresponding to coordination by 
planning or standardization, then the model would suggest a potential mismatch between 
the knowledge flows and coordination approach. 
MODEL APPLICATION 
Model application pertains to an environment in which the contextual considerations 
exert an extreme influence over knowledge and the relative efficacy of alternative 
approaches to its flow and management: military combat. Specifically, we discuss a case 
following the 1991 Gulf War in Iraq. Military combat in this case involved a very large 
number of people (e.g., over 500,000 U.S. troops, many coalition forces from other 
countries), associated with heterogeneous organizations (e.g., U.S. Air Force, Army, 
Marines, Navy, foreign services), dispersed over wide geographical areas (e.g., U.S., 
Southern Europe, Middle East, Southwest Asia, North Africa), operating in hazardous 
environments (e.g., combat zones), and performing time-critical missions (e.g., disrupting 
enemy command and control capabilities, suppression of enemy air defenses, ballistic-
missile interceptions). Using the model developed above, we explain how coordination 
mechanisms and knowledge flows in this extreme, combat context led to one of the most 
disturbing military events that can occur: fratricide, which involves allied forces killing 
and wounding allied forces.  This is oxymoronically referred to as friendly fire. The 
contextual situation is outlined first and then the explanatory model is applied to the 
friendly fire case. 
Combat Context 
When the Gulf War in Iraq ended in 1991, the United Nations established no-fly zones at 
the 32nd and 36th parallels in order to prevent the Iraqi military from continuing to attack 
ethnic minorities (e.g., Kurds) within its own population. The southern zone was 
enforced by Navy aircraft based on carriers operating in the Persian Gulf, and the 
northern zone was enforced by Air Force fighters from land bases in Turkey. Aircraft 
enforcing both no-fly zones flew many; daily missions to ensure that Iraqi military 
aircraft did not cross the parallels, plus they destroyed anti-aircraft batteries, continued 
the hunt for mobile ballistic missile launchers, and performed a number of other military 
missions for more than a decade following the war. Our focus in this case is on Air Force 
enforcement of the northern no-fly zone where the friendly fire incident occurred. 
Although only a relatively small number of aircraft would generally be airborne over 
northern Iraq at any one time, due to the omnipresent risk of conflict, it was essential for 
everyone associated with both air and ground operations in the area to know the 
locations, directions and intentions of all other aircraft and ground vehicles. Otherwise, 
Iraqi aircraft or ground units may travel into restricted areas, or even worse, allied 
aircraft or ground units may be mistaken for Iraqis and attacked.  
 
In addition to Air Force fighters patrolling the skies to enforce the no-fly zone, other 
missions required aircraft to fly in the region. These included cargo planes moving 
supplies and equipment, tanker planes performing aerial refueling operations, helicopters 
moving troops and other personnel between various locations on the ground, and others. 
To help coordinate the many flights, the Air Force employed a unique kind of aircraft—
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 airborne warning and control system (AWACS), which served as an air traffic controller 
in the sky—to track, guide and direct all aerial traffic in the area. Additionally, all Air 
Force flights were planned in advance through a process to develop air-tasking orders 
(ATOs), and all airborne operations were subject to a set of standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) that addressed everything from flight formations and radio 
frequencies to rules of engagement for combat and operation of identification friend or 
foe(IFF) equipment.  
 
Further, military personnel are extensively trained and highly skilled. Combat pilots, 
for instance, undergo years of education and training before even beginning to acquire 
on-the-job experience, and fighter squadrons are staffed with many combat veterans able 
to share important knowledge gained through their many years in the cockpit. 
Intelligence personnel monitor the evolving situation in Iraq and the rest of the operating 
area continuously, and all personnel—pilots and others alike—receive daily briefings on 
current events before performing their missions and duties. Planning personnel look 
forward, in great detail, several days to schedule each mission and flight, and the U.S. 
Military empowers a Unified Commander to oversee and direct forces from all the 
services. At least by formal design, the context appears to be tightly controlled and highly 
organized. 
 
Alternatively, the system associated with this military operation is very large and quite 
complex, with myriad interrelated elements interacting 24 hours each day, seven days a 
week. Understanding that people have bounded rationality, it is clear that no single 
individual has knowledge of all workings of the entire system, and dynamics of this large 
system are practically impossible to predict in detail. Further, the military organization is 
highly specialized, so most participants are expected to have little insight into what 
others are doing and why. Plus, personnel rotate in and out of units and assignments with 
considerable frequency, so people do not have the benefit of working and learning with 
the same team over extended periods of time. But as long as all participants adhere to 
SOPs and follow specific plans (e.g., ATOs) that are developed to guide their missions, 
the system is expected to operate without serious problems, and on a statistical basis, the 
number of such problems is remarkably small given the hazardous, geographically 
dispersed, time-critical nature of its processes. When problems do arise, however, even 
when the context and operations are indistinguishable from normal patterns, they can 
have mortal consequences. This is what happened when the friendly fire incident 
occurred. 
 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest-ranking officer in the U.S. 
Military, summarized the incident as follows (Shalikashvili 1994). 
 
For over 1000 days, the pilots and crews assigned to Operation Provide Comfort flew 
mission after mission, totaling over 50,000 hours of flight operations, without a single 
major accident. Then, in one terrible moment on the 14th of April, a series of avoidable 
errors led to the tragic deaths of 26 men and women. … In place were not just one, but 
a series of safeguards—some human, some procedural, some technical—that were 
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 supposed to ensure an accident of this nature could never happen. Yet, quite clearly, 
these safeguards failed. 
 
Summarizing from Snook’s (2000) detailed account of this incident, the following 
description helps to illustrate the context associated with knowledge flow in this incident 
(pp. 3-7). 
 
There were three key players in this incident: a U.S. Air Force … AWACS aircraft, a 
two-ship flight of Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, and a two-ship flight of Air 
Force F-15 Eagle fighters. … The AWACS took off from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey 
as the lead aircraft of 52 sorties of coalition air missions scheduled for that day. … [To 
direct all other aircraft,] this air-traffic-control-tower-in-the-sky was always the first 
mission off the ground each day. … [W]ith sophisticated radar and communications 
equipment, the AWACS could ‘positively control’ all coalition aircraft flying in 
support [of the operation]. The crew reported ‘on station’ at 0845 and began tracking 
aircraft. 
 
At 0935, [two Army] Black Hawks reported their entry into the no-fly zone to the 
AWACS enroute controller and then landed six minutes later just inside the United 
Nations (UN) designated security zone in northern Iraq [where] they picked up sixteen 
members of the UN coalition charged with leading the humanitarian relief effort. … 
At 0954, the helicopters reported to the AWACS enroute controller that they were 
departing … enroute to the towns of Irbil and Salah ad Din Iraq for meetings with UN 
and Kurdish representatives. 
 
Meanwhile, at 0935, a flight of two Air Force F-15C fighter aircraft had taken off 
from Incirlik enroute to the air space over northern Iraq. … Their mission was to 
‘perform an initial sweep of the no-fly zone to clear (sanitize) the area of any hostile 
aircraft prior to the entry of coalition forces.’ At 1020, the F-15C flight lead reported 
entering northern Iraq to the AWACS controller. … Two minutes later, the lead 
reported a ‘radar contact on a low-flying, slow-moving aircraft.’ [A series of 
communications between the F-15C pilots and the AWACS crew ensued, and the 
fighter pilots turned to intercept the unidentified aircraft. After repeated queries, the F-
15s did not receive the proper response from the unidentified aircraft IFF systems]. 
 
Following established procedure, the F-15s continued their intercept by conducting a 
visual identification (VID) pass of the contact. … The flight lead visually identified a 
helicopter and called, ‘Tally 2 Hinds.’ ‘Hind’ is the NATO designation for a Soviet-
made attack helicopter currently in the Iraqi inventory. The second F-15 … 
immediately followed with a visual identification pass of his own and called, ‘Tally 
2.’  
 
By this time the two Black Hawks had entered a deep valley. … Following their low-
level VID, the F-15s circled back behind the helicopters approximately ten miles to 
begin their firing passes. At this point, the lead notified the AWACS that fighters were 
‘engaged’ and instructed his wingman to ‘arm hot’ [(i.e., conduct his own independent 
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 targeting)]. … The lead pilot fired an AMRAAM missile at the trail helicopter from a 
range of approximately four nautical miles. Immediately following his lead, the F-15 
wingman then fired an AIM-9 Sidewinder missile at the lead helicopter from a range 
of approximately one and a half nautical miles. Both Black Hawk helicopters were 
instantly destroyed. All twenty-six people on board perished. 
 
Combat Knowledge Flows 
To analyze this incident, the focus is on knowledge flows and the extended model 
from above. Clearly, timing was critical in this incident.  Also by formal design of the 
organization process, someone should have known that the F-15s were firing on 
helicopters. Such situations are highly dependent upon rapid and effective knowledge 
flows. The discussion is organized in terms of  a few key questions pertaining to the flow 
of knowledge in this military context. 
  
First, who had knowledge that two U.S. helicopters were flying over northern Iraq that 
fateful morning? Obviously, all personnel onboard the two Black Hawks were aware of 
their position, as were their Army commanders on the ground and the UN representatives 
in northern Iraq. If the people onboard the two helicopters are categorized as one group in 
terms of the reach axis of our knowledge-flow model, and the Army/UN people on the 
ground as a second group, then at least these two groups had such knowledge. 
Additionally, recall from the summary above that the helicopter pilots notified the 
AWACS crew of their departure toward the two other Iraqi towns. If the AWACS crew 
are categorized as a third group in terms of the reach axis, then all three groups had 
knowledge of the helicopters’ presence over northern Iraq. 
  
Alternatively, it is clear that the F-15 pilots—our fourth group in the mission 
organization—did not possess such knowledge, and despite a series of communications 
between the F-15 and AWACS groups, this knowledge failed to flow to the fighters. 
Thus, in terms our model, this knowledge of U.S. helicopters flying over northern Iraq 
that morning—knowledge which is highly explicit and able to flow almost 
instantaneously by military radio—reached three of the groups associated with the 
mission organization but not the fourth. 
 
Using the three-dimensional space depicted in Figure 6 to delineate some key 
relationships between knowledge flows and coordination approaches,  the flow 
associated with this knowledge of U.S. helicopters flying over northern Iraq at the group 
level is plotted on the reach axis, for such knowledge failed to reach all groups in the 
mission organization (i.e., fell short of organization-wide reach).  This knowledge flow is 
also plotted at the high end of the explicitness axis, for AWACS and Black Hawk 
personnel knew exactly where the helicopters were flying most of the time, and this plot 
is placed at the low end of the flow-time axis, for such knowledge can flow almost 
instantaneously (e.g., sensed as radar contact, communicated by radio). This point is 
labeled “H-loc” in Figure 6 for reference. Graphically speaking, had this knowledge flow 
extended to the organization level in terms of reach (i.e., also reached the F-15 group), 
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 then the friendly fire incident would probably not have occurred. This highlights the 


































Figure 6. Mission Knowledge Flows 
  
This prompts our second question: what kept the F-15 group from knowing about the 
helicopters’ presence over northern Iraq? The answer to this question lies in the 
coordination mechanisms employed for this military operation. Specifically, 
standardization was the most heavily used coordination approach employed in the combat 
context, as every combat participant had been explicitly trained to know how such 
operations were conducted. Such explicit training falls under the rubric of military 
doctrine. For instance, every participant in the mission organization was informed that 
AWACS crews monitor and control the airspace, and standard operating procedure was 
that no flights are undertaken in the no-fly zone until the fighters have “sanitized” the 
area. Thus, coordination by standardization was designed to ensure that such explicit 
knowledge would flow throughout every mission organization (i.e., at the inter-
organization level of reach). And given the multiple years that Operation Provide 
Comfort had been underway; such knowledge should have had adequate time to diffuse 
to all organizations. This plot point is labeled “OPC” in the figure for reference.  
 
So why were the helicopters in the no-fly zone prior to the F-15 sweep? Clearly, 
coordination by standardization broke down in this case. Even though the helicopters 
were, technically, operating outside the SOP, their excursion beyond this standard was 
clearly not the first. Snook (2000) reports that nearly all military units make periodic 
process adjustments to accommodate changes in local conditions, but such local 
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 variations are not coordinated organization wide, and SOPs are slow to incorporate 
group-level adjustments enacted by local units.  
 
Moreover, the helicopter pilots, clearly, did not feel that they were in danger, for they 
had filed a flight plan within their Army organization on the ground and notified the 
AWACS group of their presence and destination in northern Iraq. Nonetheless, 
knowledge of the helicopter flight—and knowledge associated with the UH-60 unit’s 
local variations to SOP—did not flow to the F-15 group. Indeed, from our discussion 
above, note that coordination by standardization is relatively inflexible and not 
responsive to change in the short term. So it is not expected that this coordination 
approach to accommodate knowledge flows associated with a group operating outside the 
standard (e.g., the two Army Black Hawks) would be effective. 
 
Planning was also a heavily used coordination approach in the military combat 
context, as every Air Force mission and flight was explicitly delineated on the ATO, and 
the crew of every aircraft was required to read the ATO prior to the start of a mission. 
This plot point is labeled “ATO” in the figure for reference. But Army helicopter flights 
were not included on the ATOs, so Air Force aircrews relying upon this explicit 
knowledge would not tap into the knowledge flow associated with planned helicopter 
flights. Indeed, from our discussion above, we note that coordination by planning falls 
somewhere in between standardization and mutual adjustment in terms of flexibility and 
reach, so one would not expect for this coordination approach to accommodate 
knowledge flows associated with groups that are not included in the plans (e.g., the Army 
Black Hawks excluded from ATOs). 
 
Alternatively, mutual adjustment was attempted as a coordination mechanism in this 
combat situation, as every aircraft and ground unit was equipped with radios for 
communication, radar and other sensors to detect and track other aircraft, IFF systems to 
distinguish between allied and enemy aircraft, and clear canopies for VID. In the present 
case, the F-15 pilots exchanged numerous communications with members of the AWACS 
group, as well as communications between the lead and wingman. The Black Hawk pilots 
likewise communicated by radio with the AWACS crew. Such radio communications are 
supported by shared knowledge across participants, as military radio messages are 
generally transmitted through cryptic verbal codes that require considerable cultural 
compatibility between communicants as well as extensive military experience to interpret 
appropriately. This enables tacit knowledge to flow between individuals on a rapid basis. 
The knowledge flow associated with such radio communica-tions is labeled “Rad” in the 
figure. 
 
So why didn’t the AWACS group relay knowledge of the helicopters’ presence over 
northern Iraq to the F-15 group? For one thing, the AWACS group employs considerable 
specialization and division of labor, so the individuals onboard the AWACS responsible 
for communicating with enroute aircraft (e.g., Black Hawks, F-15s) are not the same 
people supporting aerial operations after the aircraft arrive in the no-fly zone. And radio 
communications are generally transmitted from individual to individual, not group to 
group. Hence, even within the AWACS group, knowledge of the helicopters’ presence in 
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 the no-fly zone failed to reach all members of the aircrew. Thus, the division of labor 
onboard the AWACS—which represents a standards-based approach to coordination—
failed to support the vital knowledge flow required for coordination by mutual 
adjustment between aircrews of the F-15 and AWACS groups. 
 
Further, it turns out that this particular AWACS crew had not trained together as an 
integrated team, so crew members had not yet learned to work effectively with one 
another. Such group-level working knowledge is highly tacit, and it can take weeks or 
months for an aircrew such as this to become proficient as an AWACS team. We plot this 
group-working knowledge as “Team” in the figure. Notice that the flow time (i.e., 
months) associated with this knowledge flow is incompatible with the kinds of rapid 
knowledge flows (i.e., minutes) required for mutual adjustment in this case. 
 
So why didn’t the F-15 and Black Hawk groups communicate directly by radio? It 
also turns out that the radio systems used by the Air Force F-15 group differed from those 
employed by the Army Black Hawk group. Although the AWACS crew was able to 
communicate with both groups, the F-15s and Black Hawks were unable to communicate 
directly with, and hence mutually adjust to, one another. Here, standardization of radio 
equipment had been effectively accomplished within two of the flying-group pairs (i.e., 
F-15s and AWACS, AWACS and Black Hawks) but not the third (i.e., F-15s and Black 
Hawks). Hence, equipment incompatibility also prevented the flow of critical knowledge 
required for mutual adjustment. 
 
Other problems further contributed to the impeded knowledge flows. For instance, the 
Black Hawk IFF equipment failed to respond with the signal expected by the F-15 pilots. 
Each day, a plan outlining new IFF codes to be used in various geographical areas is 
distributed to all flying groups, and IFF equipment on all aircraft scheduled for missions 
is checked before every flight. If all goes according to plan, IFF signals can enable the 
flow of explicit knowledge (i.e., friend or foe) between aircraft on a near-instantaneous 
basis, but interpreting the signals correctly requires tacit knowledge. The flow of such 
interpretation knowledge is labeled “IFF” in the figure. Unfortunately, a combination of 
technical and procedural factors prevented the Black Hawk IFFs from “squawking” with 
the right code, and the F-15 pilots never thought to check other codes (e.g., appropriate 
for flights outside the no-fly zone) that allied helicopters might be sending before 
downing the Black Hawks. Here, an over-reliance upon coordination by standardization 
via by planning prevented a vital flow of knowledge required for the F-15 group to adjust 
to the IFF problem exhibited by the Black Hawk group.  
 
As another instance, SOP required VID by the F-15 group prior to firing weapons, and 
all F-15 pilots receive some training on how to distinguish between allied and enemy 
aircraft. Such knowledge flows at the individual level and is quite tacit in nature, 
sometimes requiring months—or possibly even years—for pilots to learn completely. 
This knowledge flow is plotted as “VID” in the figure. But if such knowledge has not 
been learned before the pilots begin their mission, there is insufficient time for them to 
acquire VID knowledge while in the air. Here, both fighter pilots—one of which had 
considerable combat experience—misidentified the Black Hawks as Soviet-made Hinds, 
 17
 so the mutual adjustment associated with the VID failed to occur. As above, the flow 
time (i.e., months) associated with this knowledge flow is incompatible with the kinds of 
rapid knowledge flows (i.e., minutes) required for mutual adjustment in this case. In all, 
three separate opportunities for mutual adjustment—any one of which could have 
prevented the friendly fire incident—failed, and the requisite knowledge (i.e., that two 
U.S. helicopters were flying over northern Iraq that morning) failed to flow to the most 
important group: the F-15s.  
Summary 
To summarize, Figure 6 shows the plot points of several different knowledge flows 
associated with this incident. From our analysis of the incident, note the tradeoff between 
coordination by mutual adjustment and standardization (e.g., Black Hawks entering the 
no-fly zone prior to F-15 “sanitization”) and planning (e.g., helicopter flights excluded 
from the ATO). Mutual adjustment was required in the incident to compensate for 
problems of standardization.  Note also that the model from above suggests mutual 
adjustment is most appropriate to support knowledge flows near the origin of the space 
(i.e., low explicitness, low reach, and low flow time). However, notice from the plot 
points in the figure, however, that only two knowledge flows correspond to this region 
supporting mutual adjustment (i.e., “Rad,” “IFF”).  
 
Unfortunately, the communication-based knowledge flow enabled by radio equipment 
was ineffective due to incompatible systems on the Black Hawks and F-15s. With equal 
misfortune, the knowledge flow associated with IFF equipment was also ineffective due 
to incorrect interpretation by the F-15 pilots. In the figure, we draw lines through the 
corresponding labels “Rad” and “IFF” to indicate that these knowledge flows were 
ineffective at the time of the friendly fire incident. Additionally, an inexperienced 
AWACS team failed to relay knowledge of the helicopters’ presence inside the no-fly 
zone to the fighters, and the F-15 pilots lacked the requisite knowledge to correctly VID 
the U.S. helicopters. In the figure, we draw a thick line across the vector space at the 
hour’s level along the flow-time axis. This symbolizes that any knowledge involving 
longer flow times (e.g., “VID,” “Team,” “ATO,” “OPC”) was incompatible with the 
kinds of rapid knowledge flows required for effective mutual adjustment. 
 
Therefore, when examining this figure, one can see that no knowledge flows 
associated with the mission were available to support the kind of coordination by mutual 
adjustment that was required. This is not to place blame for the incident on any one or 
even multiple participants. But  this show how a mismatch between the knowledge flows 
required to prevent this tragedy (e.g., F-15 radio communications with Black Hawks, 
correct interpretation of Black Hawk IFF signals by F-15s) and the coordination 
mechanisms available to support such flows (e.g., standardization, planning) can explain 
the friendly fire incident. This provides some evidence to support the use and utility of 
our contextually extended knowledge-flow model, and it illustrates, most graphically, the 





 Future Research 
 
This technical report provides an overview of the thrust of the authors’ collaborative 
research.  In future technical reports and follow-on journal articles, we will provide the 
details to enrich the understanding of the model and expand the model to encompass 
additional phenomena.  In particular we anticipate focusing on: 
 
• The distinction among the concepts knowledge, information, and data. 
• The relationship of knowledge management to organizational process 
performance and fitness in the organization’s ecology of conflict and 
cooperation. 
• The extension of the model’s application to other organizations, military and 
civilian, and organizational processes. 
• The development of knowledge management as a organizational coordination, 
control, and adaptation technique. 
• The development of a comprehensive time-dated model that provides an 
understanding of the expanded domain of the model using the what, where, 
when, and if modeling technique. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Recent research has produced models that improve our ability to identify, describe and 
explain a diversity of knowledge-flow patterns that manifest themselves in various 
enterprises, which improves our efficacy in designing organizations and processes. But 
enterprises do not all operate in the same environmental context and current theory is 
relatively silent on contextual implications of knowledge flow. The research described in 
this technical report builds upon current theory to explicitly address the contextual 
implications of knowledge flow in terms of organization and process design. Using a 
recently developed, multidimensional model to characterize and delineate a variety of 
enterprise knowledge flows, we integrate key aspects of Coordination Theory and extend 
this model to address context.  
 
The use, utility and implications of this extended model are described through 
application to an extreme case in which knowledge flows are embedded within a 
hazardous, time-critical context with mortal consequences: a military “friendly fire” 
incident in Northern Iraq. Through analysis of this incident using the model, the tragic 
incident is explained in terms of incompatibility between knowledge flows and the 
coordination mechanisms employed to support such flows. In the end, one can 
graphically observe that the military organization lacked adequate coordination 
mechanisms to accommodate the kind of real-time mutual adjustment required to prevent 
the fratricide. 
 
The extreme nature of this application incident provides revelatory insight into the 
contextual importance of knowledge-flow dynamics, and by using such an extreme 
incident for application, the generalizability of the model to less extreme environments 
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 that are more commonly associated with non-military enterprises (e.g., corporations, 
governmental agencies) is enhanced. For instance, many large, geographically dispersed 
corporations, governmental agencies and other classes of enterprise employ standards-
based coordination mechanisms in a manner very similar to that described in this  
technical report, and coordination by planning is equally prevalent in non-military 
enterprises of all sizes. To the extent that knowledge flows in these non-military 
enterprises require mutual adjustment for process efficacy, then mismatches between 
such knowledge flows and appropriate coordination mechanisms to support are likely. 
 
Further, our contextually extended knowledge-flow model may prove to be equally 
useful in terms of explanation, prescription and diagnosis as described in the friendly fire 
case. Of course, this requires additional empirical research to verify, and such mortal 
consequences of accidents are far less likely in most corporations and governmental 
offices than in combat zones. But the routines and communication patterns of knowledge 
workers are likely to be quite similar across a wide variety of domains—in the public and 
private sectors alike—and the kinds of insights provided through research along the lines 
of this investigation may prove to be useful across a diversity of enterprises. Thus, the 
present technical report strives to take a step in this direction and add to the foundation of 
cumulative research associated with knowledge management in context.  There are many 
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